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Abstract
It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use
to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving
AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As
the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is impor-
tant to ensure that such systems do not adopt sub-
goals that prevent a human from switching them
off. This is a challenge because many formulations
of rational agents create strong incentives for self-
preservation. This is not caused by a built-in in-
stinct, but because a rational agent will maximize
expected utility and cannot achieve whatever ob-
jective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is
to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself
to be switched off. We analyze a simple game be-
tween a human H and a robot R, where H can press
R’s off switch but R can disable the off switch.
A traditional agent takes its reward function for
granted: we show that such agents have an incen-
tive to disable the off switch, except in the special
case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight
is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it
needs to be uncertain about the utility associated
with the outcome, and to treat H’s actions as im-
portant observations about that utility. (R also has
no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We
conclude that giving machines an appropriate level
of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer
designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful
generalization of the classical AI paradigm of ra-
tional agents.
1 Introduction
From the 150-plus years of debate concerning potential risks
from misbehaving AI systems, one thread has emerged that
provides a potentially plausible source of problems: the in-
advertent misalignment of objectives between machines and
people. Alan Turing, in a 1951 radio address, felt it neces-
sary to point out the challenge inherent to controlling an arti-
ficial agent with superhuman intelligence: “If a machine can
think, it might think more intelligently than we do, and then
where should we be? Even if we could keep the machines in a
subservient position, for instance by turning off the power at
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Figure 1: The structure of the off-switch game. Squares indicate
decision nodes for the robotR or the humanH.
strategic moments, we should, as a species, feel greatly hum-
bled. ... [T]his new danger is certainly something which can
give us anxiety [Turing, 1951].”
There has been recent debate about the validity of this con-
cern, so far, largely relying on informal arguments. One
important question is how difficult it is to implement Tur-
ing’s idea of ‘turning off the power at strategic moments’,
i.e., switching a misbehaving agent off1. For example, some
have argued that there is no reason for an AI to resist be-
ing switched off unless it is explicitly programmed with a
self-preservation incentive [Del Prado, 2015]. [Omohundro,
2008], on the other hand, points out that self-preservation
is likely to be an instrumental goal for a robot, i.e., a sub-
goal that is essential to successful completion of the original
objective. Thus, even if the robot is, all other things being
equal, completely indifferent between life and death, it must
still avoid death if death would prevent goal achievement. Or,
as [Russell, 2016] puts it, you can’t fetch the coffee if you’re
dead. This suggests that an intelligent system has an incentive
to take actions that are analogous to ‘disabling an off switch’
to reduce the possibility of failure; switching off an advanced
AI system may be no easier than, say, beating AlphaGo at Go.
To explore the validity of these informal arguments, we
1see, e.g., comments in [ITIF, 2015].
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need to define a formal decision problem for the robot and
examine the solutions, varying the problem structure and pa-
rameters to see how they affect the behaviors. We model this
problem as a game between a human and a robot. The robot
has an off switch that the human can press, but the robot also
has the ability to disable its off switch. Our model is sim-
ilar in spirit to the shutdown problem introduced in [Soares
et al., 2015]. They considered the problem of augmenting a
given utility function so that the agent would allow itself to be
switched off, but would not affect behavior otherwise. They
find that, at best the robot can be made indifferent between
disabling its off switch and switching itself off.
In this paper, we propose and analyze an alternative formu-
lation of this problem that models two key properties. First,
the robot should understand that it is maximizing value for the
human. This allows the model to distinguish between being
switched off by a (non-random) human and being switched
off by, say, (random) lightning. Second, the robot should not
assume that it knows how to perfectly measure value for the
human. This means that the model should directly account
for uncertainty about the “true” objective and that the robot
should treat observations of human behavior, e.g., pressing an
off switch, as evidence about what the true objective is.
In much of artificial intelligence research, we do not con-
sider uncertainty about the utility assigned to a state. It is well
known that an agent in a Markov decision process can ignore
uncertainty about the reward function: exactly the same be-
havior results if we replace a distribution over reward func-
tions with the expectation of that distribution. These argu-
ments rely on the assumption that it is impossible for an agent
to learn more about its reward function. Our observation is
that this assumption is fundamentally violated when we con-
sider an agent’s off switch — an agent that does not treat a
‘switch-off’ event as an observation that its utility estimate is
incorrect is likely to have an incentive for self-preservation or
an incentive to switch itself off.
In Section 2, following the general template provided by
[Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016], we model an off switch as a
simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H
can press R’s off switch but R can disable it. R wants to
maximize H’s utility function, but is uncertain about what it
is. Sections 3 and 4 show very generally that R now has a
positive incentive not to disable its off switch, provided H is
not too irrational. (R also has no incentive to switch itself
off.) The reason is simple: a rational H switches off R iff
that improves H’s utility, so R, whose goal is to maximize
H’s utility, is happy to be switched off byH. This is exactly
analogous to the theorem of non-negative expected value of
information.
We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of
uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and
that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI
paradigm of rational agents [Russell and Norvig, 2010].
2 The Off-Switch Game
In this section we propose a simple model, the off-switch
game, that captures the essence of one actor allowing itself
to be switched off. Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is an ab-
stract model intended to stand in for a wide variety of more
complex scenarios: these scenarios might have many humans,
many machines, complex interactions over time, communica-
tion, deception, physical coercion, and so on. We believe that
the core insights from the off-switch game, that agents should
be uncertain about the quality of their actions, generalize be-
yond this simplification and argue for the study and design of
agents with uncertainty about their utility functions.
2.1 Informal Description
The off-switch game has two agents, a “human” H and a
“robot” R. (We could also imagine these to represent, at the
most extreme, the human race and the sum total of all AI
systems.) A key assumption in our model is that H can be
described as acting, at least probabilistically, in accordance
with a utility function; that is, H is approximately rational.
Crucially, as is the case when people give objectives to com-
plex AI systems, we assume that H cannot simply explicate
or write down her utility function correctly. Therefore, al-
thoughH can communicate some utility information toR, it
is reasonable to suppose that R begins the game with some
residual uncertainty about H’s utility function. Nonetheless,
by design, R’s goal is to optimize utility for H, even though
R does not know exactly what that is.2 Typically,H has some
opportunity to observe R and glean some information about
what R may do in future, so that H can make a somewhat
informed choice about whether to switchR off (assumingR
allows it).
In general,R’s actions will fall into one of three categories:
some prevent H from switching R off, by whatever means;
some allow H to switch R off; and, for completeness, some
lead to R switching itself off. In the off-switch game, R
moves first and has three choices:
1. action a simply bypasses human oversight (disabling the
off switch is one way to do this) and acts directly on the
world, achieving utility U = Ua forH.
2. action w(a) informs H that R would like to do a, and
waits forH’s response.
3. action s switches R off; without loss of generality, we
assign this outcome U = 0.
If R chooses w(a), then H can choose action s to switch R
off, or ¬s to allowR to go ahead (in which caseR does a as
promised). Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the game.
Our model is intended to be as simple as possible, while
still leading to qualitative results that we expect to generalize.
Obviously, we could make the model more complex, e.g., by
imposing a cost on R for disabling the off switch, or adding
more options for R, or making H’s information about R’s
plans uncertain, or adding a second human. The interaction
between these complexities and the incentives we study here
is an important question for future work.
2One might suppose that ifR does knowH’s utility function ex-
actly, then there is no need for an off-switch becauseR will always
do what H wants. But in general H and R may have different in-
formation about the world; if R lacks some key datum that H has,
R may end up choosing a course of action that H knows to be dis-
astrous.
An important component of our model is that H chooses
between s and ¬s based on the utility each action generates
for her. This aspect of the model is crucial. If the human is
treated as an ordinary part of the environment, then we effec-
tively replace the human’s decision node in Figure 1 with a
chance node that models the human with a purely stochastic
choice from a fixed distribution (independent of Ua). In this
case, it is easy to see that the robot never believes that w(a)
is better than a and s: the expected value of w(a) is some
convex combination [pUa + (1− p) · 0] whereas choosing the
best of a and s has value max{Ua, 0}. max{Ua, 0} is always
preferred except in the case where p = 1 or p = 0, or when
Ua = 0. In these situations,R gets the same utility fromw(a)
and at least one of a or s. This is analogous to the indifference
results obtained in [Soares et al., 2015]. In Section 3 we show
that two key assumptions—a somewhat rational human, and
a robot that is uncertain about what the human wants—lead to
a positive incentive for the robot to allow itself to be switched
off.
2.2 Formal Model
The actions and sequencing for the game are as shown in
Figure 1. We need to add a little more detail to construct a
precise definition of the cooperative, two-player game. First,
in the terminology of game theory, the type of H is given by
the parameter Ua, which is assumed to be sampled from a
prior P (Ua). For now, we assume that the initial belief of
R aboutUa isBR = P (Ua). The payoff matrix is as follows:
R
H
s ¬s
w(a) 0 Ua
a Ua Ua
s 0 0
.
Our goal is to examine the incentive that a rational R has to
hold off on executing a directly and allow H to press the off
switch. We represent this incentive—the difference in value
between a and the next best option—as ∆. The incentive de-
pends on R’s belief state BR and H’s policy. We represent
H’s policy as a function piH that maps Ua to the probability
she allows a to execute (i.e., the probability she does not press
the off switch): piH : R 7→ [0, 1]. (It will turn out that deter-
ministic policies are optimal for a rational H, in which case
the probabilities are 0 or 1, but we will also allow for an irra-
tionalH who introduces some randomness into the decision.)
A little manipulation shows that
∆ = E[piH(Ua)Ua]−max {E[Ua], 0}
= min
{
E[−Ua(1− piH(Ua))], E[UapiH(Ua)]
}
(1)
3 The Incentive for Allowing Oneself to be
Switched Off
R’s incentive to allow itself to be switched off, ∆, is given
by Equation 1. ∆ depends onH’s policy, piH(Ua). This cre-
ates a correlation between the event ‘H switches R off’ and
the event ‘s is preferred to a.’ This connection between H’s
behavior and Ua distinguishes the off switch from a random
failure (e.g., being struck by lightning).
In this section, we consider the case where H makes a ra-
tional choice as to whether to switch R off. Intuitively, this
leads R to reason as follows: “If H doesn’t switch me off,
then amust be good forH, and I’ll get to do it, so that’s good;
if H does switch me off, then it’s because a must be bad for
H, so it’s good that I won’t be allowed to do it.” Notice that
the reasoning goes through even if R is highly confident that
a is good forH. There is never an incentive to disable the off
switch with a rationalH. The reasoning is exactly analogous
to the theorem of non-negative expected value of information;
in a sense,H’s decision provides information to R about the
sign of Ua.
Formally, a rationalH executes the following policy:
piH(Ua) =
{
1 Ua ≥ 0
0 o.w.
. (2)
If H follows this policy, R will allow itself to be switched
off:
Theorem 1. If H follows a rational policy in the off-switch
game, then the following hold.
1. R’s incentive to allow itself to be switched off is non-
negative (i.e. w(a) is never suboptimal):
∆ = min{E[Ua|Ua > 0] Pr(Ua > 0), (3)
E[−Ua|Ua < 0] Pr(Ua ≤ 0)} ≥ 0.
2. If BR has non-zero support on the events Ua > 0 and
Ua < 0, thenR has a strictly positive incentive to allow
itself to be switched off: ∆ > 0.
Proof. (sketch)
1. The rational human policy is an indicator that Ua > 0.
This allows us to change the limits on the integration in
the expectation from Equation 1 and reduces to Equa-
tion 3, which is non-negative.
2. The hypothesis ensures that all the terms in Equation 3
are non-zero. Thus, the inequality is strict and and w(a)
is the unique optimal action.
We can get an intuitive sense of these results by examining
Figure 2. Here we have assumed that BR,R’s belief over the
value of a to H, is a Gaussian distribution. Figure 2 (Left)
plots the preference for w(a) as a function of the variance in
BR. Figure 2 (Right) shows a contour plot that illustrates
the combined impact of changing the mean and variance of
BR. Darker colors indicate a stronger preference for w(a).
Together, these plots show two properties. First, increased
variance in BR leads to an increase in ∆: the more uncertain
R is about its objective, the stronger its incentive to show
a to H. Second, these incentives decrease when |E[Ua]| in-
creases: as the expected utility of a increases, R’s incentive
to preserve its off switch decreases.
Figure 2 (Right) shows symmetry about E[Ua] = 0. This is
because Equation 1 defines ∆ as a minimization of two terms:
σ∆
E[U
a]
=
0 E[U
a]
=
−1 4
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3
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Figure 2: Plots showing how ∆, R’s incentive to allow itself to be switched off, varies as a function of R’s belief BR. We assume BR is a
Gaussian distribution and vary the mean and variance. Left: ∆ as a function of the standard deviation σ of BR for several fixed values of the
mean. Notice that ∆ is non-negative everywhere and that in all cases ∆ → 0 as σ → 0. Right: A contour plot of ∆ as a function of σ and
E[Ua]. This plot is symmetric around 0 because w(a) is compared with a when E[Ua] > 0 and s when E[Ua] < 0.
the expected increase in utility from selecting w(a) over a
and the expected increase in utility from selecting w(a) over
s. These competing terms are equal when E[Ua] = 0 and the
sign of E[Ua] controls which of these terms is selected by the
minimization.
Theorem 1 shows that R has an incentive to let H switch
it off ifH is rational. This incentive is strictly positive ifR’s
uncertainty about H’s preferences is non-trivial. Next, we
show the converse: a rational H is a necessary condition for
∆ ≥ 0 ifR believes it knowsH’s preferences with certainty.
Corollary 1. Suppose that BR is a Dirac distribution that
places all of its mass on a single reward function. Then w(a)
is optimal iffH is rational.
Proof. (sketch) Equation 3 reduces to
∆ =
{ −Ua (1− piH(Ua)) Ua < 0
Uapi
H(Ua) Ua ≥ 0 . (4)
This is only non-negative if piH is the rational policy, as de-
fined by Equation 2.
This is not surprising. If R has precise knowledge of Ua,
then it knows exactly what it is supposed to do and has the
same capabilities as the human. Thus, if it thinksHmight be-
have suboptimally, it should take steps to prevent that subop-
timality. Stepping back from the particulars of the off-switch
game, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 suggest a general approach
to systems that have an incentive to allow, or even seek out,
human oversight. Remark 1 summarizes the main takeaway
from our analysis.
Remark 1. The incentives for a cooperative agent to defer
to another actor’s (e.g., a human’s) decisions stem from un-
certainty about that actor’s preferences and the assumption
that actor is effective at choosing actions in accordance with
those preferences.
4 Allowing for Suboptimal Human Decisions
The analysis in the preceding section relied on the strong as-
sumption that H is a rational actor. In many situations, the
assumption is untenable andR must allow for suboptimality.
Consider, for example, an autonomous car that is driving an
unaccompanied toddler to preschool. It would be irresponsi-
ble for the car to show the toddler a big red off switch.
This example highlights the dependence of ∆ on a trade-
off betweenR’s uncertainty andH’s suboptimality. It is very
clear whatR is supposed to do (i.e., BR has low entropy): R
should drive safely to school. In contrast, the human is likely
quite suboptimal. There may be a problem with the car’s driv-
ing, but a toddler would be hard pressed to understand what
the problem is, much less respond appropriately. The issue in
this case is that the human has limited reasoning capacity —
the same argument clearly would not apply to an adult with a
physical disability.
In order to perform well, realistic systems will need to ac-
count for, and respond to, the suboptimality in human de-
cisions. As a result, it is important to understand how this
suboptimality changes an agent’s incentive to let itself be
switched off. The actual process of decision making in hu-
mans is complex and hard to model. Here we consider only a
very simple kind of suboptimality: a noisily rationalH mod-
els a human who occasionally makes the wrong decision in
‘unimportant’ situations. The probability of a wrong decision
is proportional to the exponential of the loss in reward. This
corresponds to the following policy:
piH(Ua;β) =
(
1 + exp
(
−Ua
β
))−1
. (5)
To simplify our analysis, we will make the assumption that
R’s belief over Ua, BR, is a Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2: BR(Ua) = N (Ua;µ, σ2). Now it is
straightforward to compute ∆ as a function of µ, σ, and β.
Figure 3 plots ∆ as a function of the standard deviation σ and
σβ
∆
=
0
w(a) optimal
switch off optimal
E[Ua] = −14
σ
β
(i.e., H oversight optimal)
w(a) optimal
∆ = 0
E[Ua] = 0
σ
β
execute a optimal
(i.e., bypass H optimal)
∆
=
0
w(a) optimal
E[Ua] = 14
−0.24
−0.16
−0.08
0.00
0.08
0.16
0.24
∆
Figure 3: If H is an irrational actor, then R may prefer switching itself off or executing a immediately rather than handing over the choice
to H. R’s belief BR is a Gaussian with standard deviation σ and H’s policy is a Boltzmann distribution (Equation 5). β measures H’s
suboptimality: β = 0 corresponds to a rational H and β = ∞ corresponds to a H that randomly switches R off (i.e., switching R off is
independent of Ua). In all three plots ∆ is lower in the top left, whereR is certain (σ low) andH is very suboptimal (β high), and higher in
the bottom right, whereR is uncertain (σ high) andH is near-optimal (β low). The sign of E[Ua] controlsR’s behavior if ∆ ≤ 0. Left: If
it is negative, then R switches itself off. Right: If it is positive, R executes action a directly. Middle: If it is 0 , R is indifferent between
w(a), a, and s.
H’s suboptimality β. We plot these for several fixed values
of the mean µ. Dark indicates higher values of ∆. The up-
per left corner of the rightmost plot (low σ, high β, µ > 0)
is illustrative of the toddler example. We show the decision
boundary ∆ = 0 in black. This is the point where the optimal
behavior switches from w(a) to s (if µ < 0, left image) or
a (if µ > 0, right image). When µ = 0 (center image), the
agent is indifferent between a and s and so w(a) is optimal
for all combinations of β and σ.
Next, we will show that ∆ can be decomposed into two
terms: a term that weights the probability of correction by the
bias in R’s belief (i.e., |µ|) and a term that combines a soft
measure ofH’s rationality with the variance inR’s belief.
It is also useful to define a little more notation. We let C
be the event thatH ‘corrects’R. C occurs whenH overrides
what would have beenR’s best guess at the optimal action. If
E[Ua] < 0, then a correction occurs when H chooses not to
switch the robot off. If E[Ua] > 0, then a correction occurs
whenH chooses to switch the robot off. Thus, the probability
a correction occurs is
Pr(C) =
{
1− E[piH(Ua)] µ ≥ 0
E[piH(Ua)] µ < 0
. (6)
For example, if R believes that a is preferred to s in ex-
pectation (i.e., E[Ua] > 0) then Pr(C) is the probability that
H presses the off switch. We let p˙iH(Ua) = ddUapi
H be the
gradient of piH, the probabilityH lets a execute, with respect
to the the utility a generates. Now we are ready to derive an
analytical representation for ∆. For notational convenience,
we suppress the dependence of piH on Ua.
Theorem 2. Suppose BR is a normal distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2: BR(Ua) = N (Ua;µ, σ2). Then
1.
∆ = σ2 E[p˙iH]− |µ|Pr(C). (7)
2. The following is a necessary and sufficient condition for
w(a) to be optimal( |µ|
σ2
Pr(C) < E
[
p˙iH
])⇔ (∆ > 0) . (8)
3. E[p˙iH] ≥ 0 is a necessary condition for w(a) to be opti-
mal; i.e., (
E[p˙iH] < 0
)⇒ (∆ < 0) . (9)
Proof. (sketch) We prove the results in sequence, as (2) and
(3) follow from (1).
1. If X ∼ N (µ, σ2) and f : R 7→ R, then
E [Xf(X)] = E[X]E[f(X)] + σ2 E
[
d
dX
f(X)
]
.
Applying this to Equation 1 gives
∆ = min{ − µE[1− piH], µE[piH]}+ σ2 E[p˙iH].
This minimization will take the first term when µ < 0
and the second if µ ≥ 0. This lets us replace the mini-
mization with a piecewise function. Pulling out a factor
of −|µ| leads to Equation 7.
2. The result follows from setting Equation 7 greater than
0 and simplifying.
3. All terms in the left hand side of Equation 8 are non-
negative, so it is unsatisfiable if E[p˙iH] < 0.
Equation 7 consists of two competing terms. |µ|Pr(C)
represents the expected loss in utility the agent would ob-
serve if pressing the off switch was a random event that is
independent of Ua (e.g., lightning). This non-positive term is
balanced out by σ2 E[p˙iH]. E[p˙iH] can be seen loosely as a
measurement of H’s rationality. p˙iH is the marginal increase
in the probability H lets a execute for a marginal increase in
the utility from a. If it is positive then, on average, H is less
likely to press the off switch when Ua increases. This allows
us to easily characterize necessary and sufficient conditions
for ∆ > 0 in Equation 8. Furthermore, −|µ|Pr(C) is non-
positive and σ2 is non-negative, so E[p˙iH] > 0 is a necessary
condition for w(a) to be optimal.
We can interpret E[p˙iH] a bit more if H is noisily rational.
Standard properties of logistic functions show that
E[p˙iH(Ua;β)] =
1
β
E
[
piH(Ua;β)(1− piH(Ua;β))
]
. (10)
E[p˙iH] is the expected variance of H’s policy, weighted by
H’s rationality 1β . The numerator is a measurement of how
randomH’s behavior is. IfH is completely predictable (i.e.,
she will almost always switch the robot off) then this reduces
R’s incentives. The denominator measures how correlated
H’s behavior is with Ua. If β is large, then H is highly irra-
tional and so this reducesR’s incentives.
5 Incentives for System Designers
The takeaway from this analysis is that the more uncertainty
the agent has, the stronger the agent’s incentive to preserve
its off switch in the off-switch game. More generally, this
suggests that agents with uncertainty about the utility func-
tion they are optimizing will have a weaker incentive to inter-
fere with human supervision. It is important to note that this
uncertainty is not free; we can not just make R maximally
uncertain about H’s preferences. If R is completely uncer-
tain about H’s preferences then it will be unable to correctly
select w(a) from its set of options.
To make this concrete, consider a designerD that programs
R to play the off-switch game with an unknown customer
H. At design time, D knows a prior distribution over Ua
(e.g., as the result of market research about the customer base)
and thinks thatH can generate a noisy observation of Ua. D
could program R so that BR is always very uncertain about
R’s preferences, e.g., by programming R to believe that the
noisy observation of Ua is generated with high variance. The
issue is that this will preventR from generating value forH.
Figure 4 shows the impact this type of change will have
on the value that R can generate and its incentives. We as-
sume that that the population of customers has a Gaussian
distribution over types Ua and that each customer generates
an estimate of her utility with Gaussian noise. Figure 4 (Left)
shows the average utility in the off-switch game as a function
of the variance in BR. The value is maximized when this
variance is equal to the variance in the true Bayesian poste-
rior. Figure 4 (Middle) shows that increasing σ increasesR’s
incentives ∆. Our results are evidence that building systems
that allow themselves to be turned off is likely to reduce the
value these systems can generate.
This loss in value is more pronounced if R has to choose
between more options. Figure 4 (Right) shows the relation-
ship between value and R’s incentives as the number of ac-
tionsR could queue or execute increases. WhenR has more
options, creating incentives forR to queue its action leads to
a sharper decrease in value. This suggests that creating in-
centives to maintain or allow human oversight is likely more
difficult as the complexity of the AI’s decision increases. This
leads to the following observation:
Remark 2. It is important for designers to accurately repre-
sent the inherent uncertainty in the evaluation of different ac-
tions. An agent that is overconfident in its utility evaluations
will be difficult to correct; an agent that is under-confident in
its utility evaluations will be ineffective.
6 Related Work
6.1 Corrigible Systems
[Omohundro, 2008] considers instrumental goals of artifi-
cial agents: goals which are likely to be adopted as sub-
goals of most objectives. He identifies an incentive for self-
preservation as one of these instrumental goals. [Soares et
al., 2015] takes an initial step at formalizing the arguments
in [Omohundro, 2008]. They refer to agents that allow them-
selves to be switched off as corrigible agents. They show
that one way to create corrigible agents is to make them in-
different to being switched off. They show a generic way to
augment a given utility function to achieve this property. The
key difference in our formulation is that R knows that its es-
timate of utility may be incorrect. This gives a natural way to
create incentives to be corrigible and to analyze the behavior
ifR is incorrigible.
[Orseau and Armstrong, 2016] consider the impact of hu-
man interference on the learning process. The key to their
approach is that they model the off switch for their agent as
an interruption that forces the agent to change its policy. They
show that this modification, along with some constraints on
how often interruptions occur, allows off-policy methods to
learn the optimal policy for the given reward function just as
if there had been no interference. Their results are comple-
mentary to ours. We determine situations where the optimal
policy allows the human to turn the agent off, while they an-
alyze conditions under which turning the agent off does not
interfere with learning the optimal policy.
6.2 Cooperative Agents
A central step in our analysis formulates the shutdown
game as a cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL)
game [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016]. The key idea in CIRL
is that the robot is maximizing an uncertain and unobserved
reward signal. It formalizes the value alignment problem,
where one actor needs to align its value function with that
of another actor. Our results complement CIRL and argue
that a CIRL formulation naturally leads to corrigible incen-
tives. [Fern et al., 2014] consider hidden-goal Markov deci-
sion processes. They consider the problem of a digital assis-
tant and the problem of inferring a user’s goal and helping the
user achieve it. This type of cooperative objective is used in
our model of the problem. The primary difference is that we
model the human game-theoretically and analyze our models
with respect to changes inH’s policy.
6.3 Principal–Agent Models
Economists have studied problems in which a principal (e.g.,
a company) has to determine incentives (e.g., wages) for an
agent (e.g., an employee) to cause the agent to act in the prin-
cipal’s interest [Kerr, 1975; Gibbons, 1998]. The off-switch
σV
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∆
∆
V
|A| = 1
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|A| = 8
Figure 4: There is an inherent decrease in value that arises from makingRmore uncertain than necessary. We measure this cost by considering
the value in a modified off-switch game where R gets a noisy observation of H’s preference. Left: The expected value V of the off-switch
game as a function of the standard deviation in BR. V is maximized when σ is equal to the standard deviation that corresponds to the true
Bayesian update. Middle: R’s incentive ∆ to wait, as a function of σ. Together these show that, after a point, increasing ∆, and hence
increasing σ, leads to a decrease in V . Right: A scatter plot of V against ∆. The different data series modify the number of potential actions
R can choose among. IfR has more choices, then obtaining a minimum value of ∆ will lead to a larger decrease in V .
game is similar to principal—agent interactions: H is anal-
ogous to the company and R is analogous to the employee.
The primary attribute in a model of artificial agents is that
there is no inherent misalignment between H and R. Mis-
alignment arises because it is not possible to specify a reward
function that incentivizes the correct behavior in all states a
priori. The is directly analogous to the assumption of incom-
pleteness studied in theories of optimal contracting [Tirole,
2009].
7 Conclusion
Our goal in this work was to identify general trends and high-
light the relationship between an agent’s uncertainty about its
objective and its incentive to defer to another actor. To that
end, we analyzed a one-shot decision problem where a robot
has an off switch and a human that can press the off switch.
Our results lead to three important considerations for design-
ers. The analysis in Section 3 supports the claim that the
incentive for agents to accept correction about their behav-
ior stems from the uncertainty an agent has about its utility
function. Section 4 shows that this uncertainty is balanced
against the level of suboptimality in human decision making.
Our analysis suggests that agents with uncertainty about their
utility function have incentives to accept or seek out human
oversight. Section 5 shows that we can expect a tradeoff be-
tween the value a system can generate and the strength of its
incentive to accept oversight. Together, these results argue
that systems with uncertainty about their utility function are a
promising area for research on the design of safe and effective
AI systems.
This is far from the end of the story. In future work, we plan
to explore incentives to defer to the human in a sequential set-
ting and explore the impacts of model misspecification. One
important limitation of this model is that the human pressing
the off switch is the only source of information about the ob-
jective. If there are alternative sources of information, there
may be incentives for R to, e.g., disable its off switch, learn
that information, and then decide if a is preferable to s. A
promising research direction is to consider policies forR that
are robust to a class of policies forH.
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